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Within the American polit ical sys tem, should the courts
prohibit a legislature or a popular majority from
dissolving the state, the ultimate privatization of
previously public functions?  Less dramatically, what
should happen if a legislature at a given moment in time
in some manner seeks to abolish its police power to act to
protect public health, safety, welfare and morals?  Or
purports to suspend its power  to tax forever, or perhaps for
a fixed period of time?
These questions are perplexing, for they bring into conflict
the democratic ideal of self-government and the notion of
some irreducible minimum of power inherent in the state.
On the one hand, it is commonly thought in a democracy
the majority should prevail, subject of course to
constitutional requirements.  Thus, although we have a
Bill of Rights to ensure fundamental rights, those
constitutional provisions are themselves subject to repeal
in accordance with a constitutional ly specified process.
On the other  hand, many would accept that  regardless of
constitutions a majority could go "too far" in purporting to
reduce the power of the state and thus the ability of the
people in the future to express its will through public
means.
To understand the bearing of these general  questions on
water resources, one must explore th e way in which in
American legal thought sovereignty has sometimes been
linked with public proper ty rights and how that linkage on
occasion  has led courts to strike down legislative efforts to
surrender the public property rights in question.  Our legal
history in this regard has centered on navigable waters,
which two hundred years ago in a time of no air
transpor tation and limited sur face land tr ansportation
were of central importance to the community.  Although
the community interest was in access for commercial
purposes to the navigable waters, judicial at tent ion tended
to be directed to the ownership of the land beneath the
navigable waters.  Often those beds of navigable waters
were assumed to be inherently public — simply not
subject to alien ation  into priva te ownership regardless of
what the majority or, perhaps, even al l the people might
wish.  Thus in 1798 the highest court in Virgin ia declared
flatly that the ownership of a bed of a navigable river "is
in the Commonwealth and cannot be gran ted."  (Home,
1798).
Nineteenth century disputes over access to oyster beds
beneath navigable waters in New Jersey led to some
noteworthy judicial decisions on sovereignty and property
rights.   In 1821 a state court decision stated that navigable
bays and rivers "are common to all the citizens" and that
title to their beds is vested in the sovereign for their
benefit.  (Arnold, 1821).   This suggests not only that the
beds are inalienable to private parties — or, at a
minimum, that any permitted alienat ion is subject to a
special protective legal regime — but also that for all
purposes the sovereign holds title as a fiduciary.  Hence,
the thought emerges that the beds of navigable bodies of
water, like the navigable waters themselves, are subject to
a "public trust," an idea which has blossomed in the
twentieth century.
Martin v. Waddell, a U.S. Supreme Court decision in
1842, recognized the link between sovereignty and
property rights, saying that the state court  decision of
1821 was "unquestionably entitled to great weight."
(Martin, 1842).  Martin dealt with  a tangled web of grants
of large par ts of New Jersey by the English King, but its
essence is found in the statement that private domination
of the beds of navigable waters is unacceptable.  As Chief
Justice Roger Taney declared:
the men who first formed the English
settlements, could not have been expected to
encounter  the many hardships that unavoidably
attended their emigrat ion to the new world, and
to people the banks of its bays and rivers, if the
land under the water at their very doors was
liable to immediate appropria tion by another  as
private property; and the settler upon the fast
land thereby excluded from its enjoyment, and
unable to take a shellfish from its bottom, or
fasten a stake, or even bathe in i ts waters,




Although our ear liest judicial pronouncements about the
special status of navigable waters and their bedlands came
in regard to disputes arising in the thir teen states which
had formed the Union, the Supreme Court was quick to
extend the same thinking to other states.  (Pollard's
Lessee, 1845).  The vehicle for this extension was the
"equal footing" doctrine — largely a political idea, but one
which developed a proprietary aspect.  As a political idea,
equal footing assures that we do not have first-class and
second-class states within the American  nation — later
admitted states have the same status as the original
thir teen states.  This idea is explicitly expressed in the acts
admitting most of the states (Hanna, 1951), and the
Supreme Court has indicated in any event it is rooted in
the U.S. Constitution (Oregon ex rel. State Land Board,
1977).
As a proprietary idea, equal footing means that upon
admission to the Union, each state by operation of law
acquires title to the beds of all navigable waters within its
boundaries.  Very limited exception s are recogn ized for
prestatehood gran ts by prior  sovereigns of an area —
Mexico,  for example, in the case of the Southwest and
California — or by the federal government during the
territorial period, but for th e vast majori ty of the beds of
navigable waters the state upon admission acquires
ownership as a function of state sovereignty.  This process
is in stark contrast to the extended bargaining and explicit
grants which occurred for other types of federal land
turned over to the states.  (Gates, 1968).  And, as the
English idea that "navigable" waters were those where the
tide ebbs and flows was replaced by the American concept
that in addi tion navigable waters exist where rivers and
lakes in the interior of the country are susceptible to use
for commercial purposes, the amount of land recognized
as held in a sta te sovereign capacity has increased
considerably.  (Dunning, 1996)
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
State title to the beds of navigable waters is an important
matter, but the fiduciary manner in which that title is held
is of even greater  significance.  For the beds, as  for other
sovereign resources, the state has a duty "to protect the
people's common heritage" (National Audubon Society,
1983).  Exercise of this duty can have important
consequences for private rights in land and other natural
resources, including water.  Most legal analysis of this
duty occurs under the rubric of the "public trust doctrine."
(U.C. Davis Law Review, 1980; Environmen tal Law,
1989).  One judicial decision, now over one hundred years
old, has had enormous influence on both courts and
commentators in their analysis of the public trust doctrine,
particularly in the past thirty years.  (Dunning, 1996).
That is Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, a
U.S. Supreme Court decision which dealt with an
uncompensated legislative revocation of a grant of over a
thousand acres of Chicago's outer harbor to a railroad.
The Court there rebuffed the railroad's challenge to the
revocation, and in  doing so it emphasized both the
sovereign basis of the public trust doctrine and the
consequence of the fiduciary obligation  which  grows out
of the sovereign status.  It said, for example, that the beds
of navigable waters such as Lake Michigan are held "by
the people in trust  for their common use and of common
right as an incident of their sovereignty" (emphasis
added), attributing sovereignty to the people themselves,
and that as a consequence disposition  of those beds cann ot
be subject to an "irrepealable" contract.  (Illinois Central,
1892).  Illinois was free to revoke its ill-advised grant —
one an historian has suggested was tain ted by corruption
(Myers, 1968) — without compensating the railroad for
any increase in the value of the property.  (The City of
Chicago, designated in the original bill as the gran tee of
the harbor lands and in the final legislation as the
recipient of the purchase price of $800,000, had refused to
accept any payment.)
Illinois Central has been followed by courts in over three
dozen states, often in disputes over the alienation of the
beds of navigable waters to private persons or entities.  A
dramatic recent example of the power of the public trust
doctrine involved another grant of part  of the bed of Lake
Michigan in Chicago, this time a mere 18.5 acre parcel
conveyed by the Illinois legislature for the expansion of a
private university campus.  Despite various indications in
the legislation of how the expansion would be in the
public interest, a feder al district court in reliance on
Illinois Central and subsequent state court decisions
permanently enjoined the university from placing fill
material on the parcel.  (Lake Michigan Federation,
1990).
Most public trust doctrine cases in this century have dealt
with the beds of navigable waters, and most have sought
to accommodate the public r ight to access to navigable
waters for navigation, fishing and other purposes with the
constant pressure to fill  and develop these areas for
business use, housing, airports and other uses.  Until the
modern environmental movement  of the last thi rty years,
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generally the accommodation favored development —
witness the fact that over  forty percent of San Fr ancisco
Bay, the West Coast's largest estuary, was filled by 1966.
(San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission, 1966).  Within  the past thi rty years,
however, development in areas of navigable water has
slowed considerably, often because of coastal zone or
shoreline management and regulatory schemes of one kind
or another.
One consequence of the modern environmental protection
movement for the public trust doctrine has been a
broadening of the purposes stated for the protective
fiduciary duty.  To the historic trilogy of use for
navigation, commerce and fishing — with "commerce"
clearly involving that linked to navigation, such as
business on wharves — courts in some jurisdictions have
added preservation.  In California, for example, in a
dispute over tidelands in Tomales Bay, the state supreme
court noted that the public uses of tidelands "are
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs"
and said there is "growing public recognition that one of
the most important public uses . . . is the preser vation  of
those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for  scientific study, as open space, and as
environments which provide food and habitat for birds
and marine l ife, and which favorably affect the scenery
and climate of the area."  (Marks, 1971).  Statements such
as these subtly move the public t rust  doctrine from a right
of access to navigable waters in whatever condi tion they
are found to one that requires that  some quantitative
and/or qualita tive standard be maintained.  In other
words, the "natural  state" of tidelands can exist only if the
water is there.
THE MONO LAKE LITIGATION
For sovereignty and water r ights, a decision of major
significance was handed down in 1983 in litigation in
California over diversions by the City of Los Angeles from
fresh water tributaries of the highly saline Mono Lake.
(National Audubon  Society,  1983).  Increasing diversions
by the city since 1940 had caused a dramatic decline in the
lake's level, creating serious concerns both over the impact
on wildlife and, given fierce dust storms dominated by
alkaline mater ial from the newly exposed lakeshore,
human health .  Those challenging the diversions advanced
several legal theories, but their success came from
invocation of the public trust doctrine.
Until the Mono Lake litigation, cases involving the public
trust doctrine in California typically had involved a
conflict between sovereign prerogatives and private rights
in land.  (Dunning, 1980).  From a public use perspective,
however, the concern had usual ly been access to the
navigable waters above some parcel of land, for example
land a private grantee might seek to fill for development.
Although no public trust doctrine case had involved water
rights, it had always been obvious that the exercise of
water rights could have the same sort of detrimental
effects as the exercise of land rights.  To dry up a lake
over time by diverting all the inflow is functionally
comparable to drying it up by draining and filling it.
In its 1983 Mono Lake decision, the Supreme Cour t of
California noted the tension  between the public rights of
access to and preservation of navigable waters — Mono
Lake had been found to be such in an  earlier  decision
(City of Los Angeles, 1935) — and the rights of water
appropriators to divert water and put i t to reasonable
beneficial use.  It said the public trust doctrine and the
prior  appropria tion water right  system were in some sense
on a "collision course," but it refused to subordinate one to
the other.  Instead, it ruled, there must be an
accommodation:  the exercise of appropriative water rights
is to be limited whenever feasible in  order to protect public
trust values.
Precisely what the Mon o Lake ruling in 1983 meant  for
diversions of water by the City of Los Angeles in the
Mono Basin took many years to work out.  After a number
of different judicial proceedings, however, a state agency
decided upon an accommodation  which severely restricts
diversion.  (Koehler, 1995).  Very litt le diver sion will be
permitted unti l the lake r ecovers to a specified level;
thereafter, the city's diversions will be less than half the
volume of water routinely diverted prior to the litigation.
The Mono Lake lit igat ion pr omises profound
consequences for Cal ifornia water rights law, as long-
established diversions and impoundments approved in an
earlier  time are reevaluated.  The eth ic of the past that
fresh water reaching the sea in California (or a saline sink
such as Mono Lake) is "wasted" — an ethic which
supported a constitutional amendment in California — is
being replaced by an accommodation that is far more
sensi tive to environmental concerns.  (Dunning, 1993).
This realignment is being driven par tly by the public trust
doctrine and part ly by some statutory fish protection
measures which are often regarded as a partial
codifica tion of the public trust doctrine, but water quality
and endangered species legislation are playing an
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important role as well.
IDAHO'S STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
These developments in  California water law have not been
greeted with enthusiasm in all quarters.  The most hostile
reaction has been in  Idaho, a  state currently dominated
politically by agricultural , timber and mining interests
threatened by the prospect of a natural resources
realignment giving greater weight to environmental
protection.  Recent legislation in Idaho purports to
preclude most applica tions of the publ ic trust doctrine,
raising squarely the question whether public righ ts rooted
in sovereignty can be so drastically reduced.  Just as one
can ask whether  a legislature may be permitted to dissolve
the state, one can question whether it may disavow long
standing public rights to the enjoyment of navigable
waters.
The public trust doctrine has never been used in Idaho to
restrict the exercise of a water right, but shortly after the
Mono Lake decision in California in 1983 the Idaho
Supreme Court in a case about a yacht club lease
undertook a thorough  review of the public trust doctrine.
In its comprehensive discussion, the court stated its
approval of the Mon o Lake decision and commented that
"the public trust doctrine takes precedence even over
vested water rights."  (Kootenai Environmental  Alliance,
1983).  This point was reaffirmed a few years later in a
decision on the massive Snake River Basin Adjudication,
although in the context of that adjudication environmental
groups were denied permission to intervene in order to
raise public trust concerns.   (Idaho Conservation League,
Inc., 1995).  Timber interests joined farmers in their alarm
over the public trust doctrine when that same year the
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an environmental group
could make a public trust claim where it alleged a  timber
sale on sta te endowment lands would produce erosion
damaging to a navigable waterway.  (Selkirk-Priest Basin
Association, 1995).
Agricultural and timber interests in Idaho prevailed upon
the legislature in 1996 to enact a radical measure on the
public trust doctrine.  An act commonly known as House
Bill 794 states, for example, that in Idaho the public trust
doctrine "shall not apply" to the appropriation or use of
water or to the granting, transfer, admin istration  or
adjudication of water rights.  (Idaho Code, 1996).
Proponents of this  legislation justified it on  the theory the
public trust doctrine is a creature of the "common law,"
i.e. judge-made law, and that therefore the doctrine can be
modified or eliminated at will by the legislature.
Legislative findings asserted that the public trust doctrine
creates "confusion" in the management of state waters and
endowment lands and that other laws sufficient ly protect
the public interest in those resources.  (Idaho Code, 1996).
Although House Bill 794 is vulnerable to attack on both
federal and Idaho constitutional grounds, (Blumm et al.,
in press) it is the give-away of public rights rooted in
sovereignty which is th e most offensive feature of the
statute.   The er ror of the Idaho legislature is to treat the
public trust doctr ine as merely a conventional common
law rule.   In fact, in American legal thought — as in the
legal thought  of societies as far back as the Eastern Roman
Empire (Stevens, 1980) — sovereign rights are
fundamental ones not subject to comprehensive
repudiat ion by the legislature.  As one court noted, "[t]he
very purpose of the public trust doctrine is to police the
legislature's disposition  of public lands."  (Lake Michigan
Federation, 1990).  As the Mono Lake litigation
demonstrates,  through th e public trust doctrine the courts
also when appropriate provide for constraining the
legislatively authorized award of water rights which, when
exercised, impact navigable waters.  They act when the
legislature abdicates the state's role as trustee to the
advantage of private par ties.
Idaho is not the only state where courts have had to deal
with legislative abdication of sovereign rights in recent
years.  In 1987, the Arizona legislature purported to
"quitclaim" any state title "based on navigability" to many
bedlands throughout th e state.  (Arizona Session Laws,
1987).  Four year s later, the Arizona Court of Appeals
invalidated the statute.  (Arizona Center for Law in the
Public Interest,  1991).  In a  judicial opinion  which
combined an analysis of the public trust doctrine with
considerat ion of the gi ft clause of the Arizona
constitution, which prohibits public entities in Arizona
from making "any donation or grant, by subsidy or
otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation"
(Arizona Constitution, 1910), the court found by failing to
allow for a particularized assessment of the public rights
being surrendered the legislature was derelict regarding
"the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for the
use and enjoyment of present and future generations."
(Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, 1991).
The Arizona legislature responded by setting up a
navigable stream adjudication commission to engage in
the particularized assessment referenced by the Court of
Appeals.  (Arizona Session Laws, 1992).
At the t ime of writing of this paper , to the author's
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knowledge no litigation has been filed to challenge Idaho's
House Bill 794.  Should such li tigation develop, the courts
will be called upon to review its validity.  Any court
hesitates before striking down a majoritar ian measure,
particularly where there is no express constitutional
provision upon which to rely.  But in the case of sovereign
rights, ones which historically involve the public's
enjoyment of our heritage of navigable waters, courts on
a number of occasions have found that legisla tures have
gone too far in their privatization efforts.  In Illinois
Central, the Illinois legislature it self realized its mistake
and revoked its grant of Chicago's outer harbor to the
railroad.  But in later Ill inois cases, as in the Arizona
situation, there was no legislative revocation.  Yet courts
in those instances acted to protect public sovereign rights
— to enforce the sta te's duty "to protect the people's
common heri tage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands."  (National Audubon Society, 1983).  The Idaho
courts should do no less.
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